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THE SPECIAL THEORY OF RELATIVITY AND 
THEORIES OF DIVINE ETERNITY 
William Lane Craig 
Recent theories of divine timeless eternity have appealed to the Special The-
ory of Relativity, either illustratively or substantively, in order to explicate 
and defend the notion of a timeless God's being really related to temporal 
moments and events. I argue that besides in some cases misusing STR. these 
theories presuppose without justification a certain interpretation of STR 
which. while widespread, is ill-founded and dubious. 
Introduction 
Although studies of divine eternity written during the previous generation-
such as Nelson Pike's standard work, God and Timelessness1-paid scant 
attention to the nature of time insofar as it plays a role in physical theory, 
contemporary analyses of divine eternity often make explicit appeal to physi-
cal theory, and particularly to the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), in 
support of the doctrine of divine timelessness. This appeal may be primarily 
illustrative, as in the case of the Stump-Kretzmann model of divine eternity.2 
On the other hand, STR may play an essential role in the construction and 
defense of the coherence of a model of divine eternity, as in Brian Leftow's 
theory. 3 If the appeal to STR turns out to be nugatory, then in the former case 
one has lost a physical analogy to one's theory and thereby any credibility 
which that analogy may have lent to one's metaphysical model; but in the 
latter case the results are more serious because with the removal of its rela-
tivistic underpinnings one's model collapses into incoherence. 
It is important, therefore, especially for proponents of the latter sort of 
model, that the legitimacy of the appeal to STR be thoroughly explored. It is 
my fear, however, that this exercise has not been carried out by proponents 
of divine timeless eternity and that as a result STR may have been both 
misused and naively interpreted by them. In order to explore this question. 
let us consider Leftow's recent exposition and defense of his theory.4 
Examination of Leftow's Theory 
Two fundamental tenets of Leftow's theory, namely, (i) that temporal things 
exist both in time and in timeless eternity and (ii) that the timeless presence 
of all things to God in eternity is compatible with objective temporal becom-
ing, depend essentially upon the legitimacy of the application of Einsteinian 
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relativity to temporal events in relation to God. Let us look more closely, 
therefore, at Leftow's exposition and defense of these two tenets. 
(i) The Existence of Temporal Things in Timeless Eternity 
(a.) The Zero Thesis 
Leftow bases his defense of (i) on what he calls the Zero Thesis: that the 
distance between God and every spatial being is zero. The argument for this 
thesis is simple: if God is not located in space, there can be no spatial distance 
between God and spatial beings; therefore, there is none. 
This argument seems to involve a category mistake, however. Leftow him-
self states the objection clearly: 
... God is not the kind of thing of which we can affirm or deny distance: 
... 'there can be no spatial distance between God and spatial creatures' is a 
category-negation rather than an ordinary negation, and so its semantics are 
such that it does not entail the Zero Thesis .... the Zero Thesis is actually 
ill-formed. For it arguably is equivalent to 'there is a distance between God 
and spatial creatures, and this distance is zero,' a conjunctive proposition 
whose first conjunct the doctrine of categories declares nonsensical.s 
One may not therefore validly infer from God's spacelessness that the dis-
tance between God and any spatial being is zero. 
The foregoing objection seems to be well-founded. The dispute between 
Lorentzian and Einsteinian Relativity provides a salient example from the 
history of science of the crucial difference between a category-negation and 
the negation of a property. Nineteenth century aether theories originally pos-
ited as the medium of transmission of electromagnetic radiation an invisible, 
rigid liquid, like glass, which was nonetheless completely intangible and 
utterly at rest with respect to absolute space. With the publication of his STR 
paper in 1905, Einstein rejected the existence of the classical aether and along 
with it the privileged rest frame. But in 1916, at the prompting of Lorentz 
that the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) admits the possibility of a sta-
tionary aether, Einstein introduced a new relativistic conception of the ether: 
the space-time itself as described by the metrical tensor gJlv. 6 When Einstein 
lectured at Lorentz's University of Leiden in 1920, he drew a fundamental 
distinction between the classical aether and his new relativistic ether on the 
basis of the applicability of the category of motion to the aether frame: 
As regards the mechanical nature of Lorentz's aether, one might say of it, 
with a touch of humor, that immobility was the only mechanical property 
which H. A. Lorentz left it. It may be added that the whole difference which 
the special theory of relativity made in our conception of the aether lay in this, 
that it divested the aether of its last mechanical quality, namely immobility .... 
The most obvious viewpoint which could be taken of this matter appeared to 
be the following. The aether does not exist at all.. .. 
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However, closer reflection shows that this denial of the aether is not de-
manded by the special principle of relativity. We can assume the existence 
of an aether; but we must abstain from ascribing a definitive state of motion 
to it, i.e., we must by abstraction divest it of the last mechanical characteristic 
which Lorentz had left it.. .. 
Generalizing, we must say that we can conceive of extended physical objects 
to which the concept of motion cannot be applied .... The special principle 
of relativity forbids us to regard the aether as composed of particles, the 
movements of which can be followed out through time, but the aether hy-
pothesis as such is not incompatible with the special theory of relati vity. Only 
we must take care not to ascribe a state of motion to the aether.7 
Privately Einstein confessed to Lorentz, "It would have been more right if I 
had limited myself, in my previously published papers, to lay emphasis only 
on the non-existence of any velocity of the ether instead of the defense of 
the total non-existence of the ether."8 
When Einstein denied a velocity or state of motion of the ether, he was 
emphatically not ascribing to it the property of immobility. For that would 
be to admit that the ether constitutes a reference frame, as Lorentz claimed, 
and therefore serves in virtue of its immobility as a privileged frame relative 
to which absolute motion, simultaneity, and length exist. Rather the relativis-
tic ether is, as Kostro puts it,9 an ultra-referential reality to which the category 
of motion does not even apply. 
When Leftow infers from God's spacelessness that the distance between 
God and spatial things is zero, he seems to commit the same error as would 
someone who inferred from the ultra-referential status of the relativistic ether 
that its motion is zero. Leftow defends his inference by asking how, if the 
Zero Thesis and its equivalent "There is a distance between God and spatial 
creatures, and this distance is zero" are ill-formed nonsense, we can under-
stand them well enough to tell that they are equivalent. The answer is that 
we understand analogous well-formed statements about spatially distant ob-
jects (and rest frames) well enough to see what has gone wrong in these 
ill-formed statements about a spaceless being or an ultra-referential reality. 
Leftow further defends his inference by asserting that the equivalent men-
tioned is problematic only if a zero distance is a positive distance. By "posi-
tive" he does not mean positive in the numerical sense, for that would be not 
merely problematic but contradictory. Rather he means positive in the sense 
of ontological status. But if Leftow means to assert more than a category-ne-
gation, he must be ascribing positive, existential status to the zero distance 
between creatures and God. That is just as problematic as ascribing zero 
motion to the relativistic ether. Finally, Leftow defends his Zero Thesis by 
claiming that it is an entailment of the true and intelligible statement that 
"Necessarily, there is no distance between God and any spatial thing." But 
this statement is true and intelligible only insofar as it is a category-negation, 
and as such it does not entail the Zero Thesis. 
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What is disquieting about this apparent failure of the Zero Thesis is that 
Leftow's entire theory of divine eternity appears to balance like an inverted 
pyramid on this Thesis, so that with the untenability of that thesis the whole 
theory threatens to topple. Without the Zero Thesis, I do not know how to 
save Leftow's theory, for without it there is no "frame of reference" in which 
all things exist changelessly relative to God-which fact should become 
clearer as we proceed. 
According to Leftow, the Zero Thesis has a startling consequence: since 
the distance between God and any creature is always the same (zero), there 
is no motion relative to God. Now, of course, in the sense of a category-ne-
gation there is no motion relative to God, since God is not a reference frame 
any more than is the relativistic ether. But Leftow takes this consequence to 
mean that God is or has a reference frame and that the motion of things in 
space relative to that frame is zero. He writes, "That there is no motion 
relative to God does not entail that there is no motion relative to other things. 
There is nothing problematic in the thought that an object at rest in one frame 
of reference (e.g., God's) is in motion in other reference-frames."10 What is 
problematic, however, is the slide from speaking colloquially of God's "frame 
of reference" to treating this as a sort of reference frame related relativisti-
cally to other physical reference frames. A reference frame is a conventional 
standard of rest relative to which measurements can be made and experiments 
described. In STR our concern is specifically with inertial frames, which are 
reference frames comprising certain regions of space and time within which, 
to some specified degree of accuracy, every test particle which is initially at 
rest remains at rest and every test particle that is initially in motion continues 
that motion without change in speed or direction. 11 Such a conception obvi-
ously cannot be applied to God in any literal sense; He has no reference frame 
as such. But then it is simply inept to speak of objects at rest (zero motion) 
relative to God. 
(b.) Thesis (M) 
Leftow proceeds to broach the following thesis, which he characterizes as 
"eminently defensible": 12 
M. There is no change of any sort involving spatial, material entities unless 
there is also a change of place, i.e. a motion involving some material entity. 
This is a sweeping claim which would require for its defense some account 
of what constitutes a change (cf. Cambridge changes). But let that pass. I 
simply want to observe at this point that (M) is incompatible with a tensed, 
or (to borrow McTaggart's convenient terminology) A-theory of time. For 
according to that theory, the physical world undergoes objective changes in 
tense; indeed, this is the essence of temporal becoming. There are tensed 
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facts, such as that It is now t, that are constantly changing whether anything 
changes spatially or not. 13 Temporal change does not entail spatial change. 14 
Insofar as he endorses (M), therefore, Leftow is implicitly endorsing a tense-
less, or B-theory of time. This conclusion is important because Leftow avers 
that his theory is compatible with an A-theory of time and becoming. 
(c.) Reduction of Time to Physical Time 
Since there can be no spatial motion relative to God, (M) is said to imply 
that no spatial thing can change in any way in relation to God. Leftow then 
goes on to make the surprising assertion that "if there is any truth in contem-
porary physics," then even non-spatial entities such as changeable angels or 
disembodied souls do not exist. ls He justifies this assertion by pointing out 
that time is one of the dimensions in the four-dimensional space-time mani-
fold and that whatever is located in one dimension is ipso facto located in 
the others as well. Therefore, if it is correct to represent time as a dimension 
of the manifold, nothing can be in time unless it is also in space; only spatial 
things are temporal. Since only temporal things can change, it follows that 
only spatial things can change. 
One could quarrel with this argument on the grounds that it takes insuffi-
cient cognizance of the difference between coordinate time and parameter 
time. Insofar as time plays the role of a coordinate, it is connected with a 
system of spatial coordinates, so that anything to which a temporal coordinate 
can be assigned is such that spatial coordinates are assignable as well. But 
insofar as time functions as a parameter, it is independent of space, and 
something which possesses temporal location and extension need not, argu-
ably, be held to exist in space as well. In Newtonian mechanics, time plays 
the role of a parameter, not a coordinate, and, interestingly, the same is true 
of Einstein's formulation of STR-the familiar space-time formulation de-
rives later from Minkowski. STR can be validly formulated in either way. 
Moreover, since STR is a local theory only, we must, in order to achieve a 
global perspective, consider time as it functions in GTR-based cosmological 
models, which Leftow neglects to do. 
But let all that pass. My reservations about Leftow's argument at this point 
are much more deeply laid; namely, I have deep misgivings about the very 
conception of time which seems to underlie his reasoning. Leftow's argument 
appears to rest upon a crucial presupposition that will affect fundamentally 
one's theory of eternity and time and therefore deserves to be discussed at 
some length, namely, a reductionistic equation of time and space with physi-
cal time and space. 
In making this assumption, it must be admitted, Leftow does stand within 
the mainstream of philosophy of space and time since Mach. 16 Under the 
influence of Mach's positivism, twentieth century philosophy of space and 
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time has been dominated by a reductionistic, verificationist conception of 
time which equates time with time as it plays a role in physics. Physicists 
and philosophers of space and time during the first half of this century shared 
alike Mach's abhorrence for what was called "metaphysics." An instructive 
piece is a 1941 article by Henry Margenau ostensibly defending metaphysical 
elements in physics. Observing that "our time appears to be distinguished by 
its taboos, among which there is to be found the broad convention that the 
word metaphysics must never be used in polite scientific society," Margenau 
counters that there not only are, but ought to be, metaphysical elements in 
physical science. 17 But then he emasculates this bold contention by explaining 
that he means thereby that we must have "epistemology"; but as physicists 
"we reject ontology."18 He reduces metaphysics to what he calls the method-
ology of science, and insists that we must not relax our standards here, lest 
the "obnoxious ontological elements" find their way back into science. 19 
What these elements are he leaves in no doubt: the luminiferous aether and 
simultaneity in different Lorentz frames are classed along with the external 
world and the Ding-an-sich and dismissed as "ultra-perceptory and hence 
meaningless."2o This jildgement is based on the "positivistic criticism" that 
propositions not verifiable in principle are meaningless, a criterion which 
elicits Margenau's ringing endorsement: "this recognition should be one of 
the premisses of philosophy of science; it enjoys, indeed, almost universal 
consent."21 As a result of positivism's influence, contemporary philosophy of 
space and time has implicitly and almost unquestioningly been the philosophy 
of physical time and space. 
But the question arises, why should we follow in the Machian train? This 
is a philosophical, not a scientific, question. Rejection of the equation be-
tween time and physical time would not contradict "any truth in contemporary 
physics." What the reductionist fails to appreciate is that time as it plays a 
role in physics may be but a pale abstraction of a much richer metaphysical 
reality. Newton realized this when he drew a distinction between time itself 
and our "sensible measures" of time. People "defile the purity of mathemati-
cal and philosophical truths who confound real quantities with their relations 
and sensible measures."22 I am not here plumping for a substantivalist, as 
opposed to relational, view of time, but merely saying that however time is 
constituted, there is no reason to think it identical with the measurement 
procedures which are used to define time operationally in physics. 
Take, for example, the question of the status of temporal becoming. Ac-
cording to Newton, time itself "flows equably without relation to anything 
external, and by another name is called duration ... this duration ought to be 
distinguished from what are only sensible measures thereof.. .. "23 In time 
itself physical events become successively present; but Newton seems to 
leave it open whether this aspect of time is preserved in our physical measures 
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of time. A persuasive case can be made, I think, that physical time is a 
tenseless, B-theoretical time which has been abstracted from the richer A-
theoretical metaphysical time in order to rid scientific theories of indexical 
elements and thus render them universalizable. Max Black explains: 
It is easy to understand why theoretical physics should express its formal 
results in a language that is independent of context, using formulas or sen-
tences from which the occasion words are absent. This procedure has the 
great advantage of no reconstruction of the original context being required 
on the part of any reader. ... If a scientist were to say, 'I then saw a green 
flash at the edge of the sun's disk,' anyone who was absent at the time of the 
original observation would need to know who spoke, and where and when, 
in order to obtain the intended information. No such supplementary informa-
tion is needed in order to understand Boyle's law or any other freely repeat-
able scientific statement.24 
Because of its universalizing tendency, its abstraction from the here and now, 
physical time does not seem to possess an A-theoretical structure. As a result, 
Black went so far as to advise physicists to stop talking about "time" in their 
theories and to refer to their own concept simply as "t"!25 This is no doubt 
asking too much. But it does show that the simplistic equation between time 
and physical time is illicit. Hence, (pace reductionists like Griinbaum, for 
example) it does not follow from the B-theoretical structure of physical time 
that temporal becoming is therefore mind-dependent or non-objective. As 
Peter Kroes points out in his discriminating book Time: Its Structure and Role 
in Physical Theories, the universality of the laws of physics seems to preclude 
the introduction of the notion of the flow of time on the basis of these laws, 
but that does not imply that temporal becoming is therefore unreal: "Whether 
or not it is in principle impossible for physics to incorporate the flow of time 
in its descriptions of physical reality, is still an open question. Up to the 
present, all attempts to capture this mysterious but essential aspect of time 
in the language of physics have failed."26 In Kroes's view, the notions of past, 
present, and future are essential for what he calls "real time," even though, 
in his judgement, these notions have yet to be successfully integrated into 
physical time. The contention here is not that temporal becoming is incom-
patible with physical time; there are a number of ways of showing how, for 
example, objective temporal becoming can be made compatible with STR, 
as Leftow himself recognizes. But the point is that such an integration in-
volves the introduction of something into physical time from outside physics; 
physical theory itself knows nothing of A-determinations and temporal be-
coming. But these notions can be legitimately integrated with physical time 
only if there exists a metaphysical time from which physical time has been 
abstracted. 
Even some positivist philosophers of science are willing to admit that 
notions which find no proper place in the time of physics are quite legitimate 
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once one broadens his scope of inquiry. Thus, Philipp Frank, who denounces 
metaphysical sentences as meaningless, qualifies this by stating, " ... they are 
meaningless as far as science is concerned."27 When we begin to ask ques-
tions of a broader scope, the meaningfulness of such sentences may emerge: 
Our judgment about the usefulness of such expressions may change consid-
erably if we consider the realm not only of physical facts in the narrower 
sense (e.g., the motion of planets) but ask also for a general picture of the 
world and include the phenomena of human behavior as facts to be repre-
sented.28 
Frank even goes so far as to state that here religious beliefs may enter the 
picture-a commendable display of openness for a positivist philosopher! 
Now obviously, Leftow does not regard metaphysical sentences as mean-
ingless; but his view of time as constricted to the time of physics does seem 
to be positivistic and reductionist, leading him in turn to deny the existence 
of non-spatial, temporal beings and thus evincing a scientistic attitude which 
even a positivist like Frank would consider too narrow. I am reminded in this 
connection of Alvin Plantinga's advice to Christian philosophers that they 
have their own agenda to pursue and should display more boldness and 
autonomy over against the concerns which secular philosophy deems legiti-
mate.29 It would be ironic if a Christian philosopher like Leftow were, out of 
some misplaced deference to the "truth of contemporary physics," led to 
adopt a positivistic view of time and to deny, as a consequence, important 
Christian doctrines pertinent to angelology/demonology and to the interme-
diate state of the soul after death.30 
Of course, Leftow's motivation for denying the existence of changeable 
angels/demons and disembodied souls is clear: if there are non-spatial, chang-
ing beings, then there will exist a metaphysical time and, hence, a "frame of 
reference" in which things are changing relative to God. But then it will be 
false that all things are timelessly present to God in eternity. Therefore Leftow 
is obliged to deny the existence of temporal, non-spatial beings. This he 
accomplishes by the positivistic constriction of time to physical time. There 
is not only a theological price to be paid for this reduction, however; since 
physical time is a B-theoretic time only, Leftow's theory of the relationship 
of eternity to time will be incompatible with the A-theory, which fact he is 
anxious to deny. 
(d.) Timeless Presence of Temporal Events to God 
On the basis of the Zero Thesis, (M), and the constriction of time to physical 
time, Leftow concludes that there is no change relative to God. Unfortunately, 
none of the supporting theses for this inference is plausibly true. All of the 
errors described thus far seem to come home to roost in the following con-
clusion: "So if a frame of reference is a system of objects at rest relative to 
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one another, then it appears that God and all spatial objects share a frame of 
reference, one in which nothing changes."3! This conclusion is analogous to 
the statement that spatial objects and space-time (the relativistic ether) are at 
rest relative to one another and therefore exist in a common reference frame-
as though God or space-time could be said to constitute a reference frame 
and so be at rest with respect to spatial objects or to exist in the same reference 
frame as spatial objects! 
Since an event occurring in one reference frame occurs in all (albeit simul-
taneous with different groups of events), explains Leftow, all events which 
occur in other reference frames also occur in the frame at rest relative to God. 
All temporal events are therefore timelessly present to God. By invoking 
Relativity Theory at this point in his argument, Leftow is able to stave off 
the Eleatic conclusion that because God is changeless and there is no change 
relative to God, therefore motion and change are mere illusions masking a 
static reality. By holding that change is real in physical reference frames and 
making all change relative change, Leftow is able to hold that while change 
is real relative to some frames it is non-existent relative to God's "frame." 
But the difficulty I have with this account of how all temporal events can 
be timelessly existent relative to God's "frame of reference" is that there just 
does not seem to be any such "frame of reference" in which all events are 
simultaneous. Certainly there is no such physical reference frame, and the 
addition to these of God's "frame of reference" does not seem to change the 
picture, since the timelessness of events in the eternal frame depends upon 
the defective Zero Thesis, (M), and the reduction of time to physical time. 
Unless some more secure foundation can be found for the existence of such 
a frame, it will remain problematic how all temporal events can exist time-
lessly relative to God. 
(ii) The Compatibility of the Timeless Presence of All Things 
to God in Eternity and Objective Temporal Becoming 
(a.) Local Simultaneity in God's "Frame" 
On the basis of his argument for tenet (i) Leftow claims that" ... relative to 
God, the whole span of temporal events is always actually there, all at once. 
Thus in God's frame of reference, the correct judgment of local simultaneity 
is that all events are simultaneous."32 This is a dark saying. If we are to make 
sense of it, we must construe "always" to mean something like "tenselessly," 
since God's frame of reference is timeless, not sempiternal. For the same 
reason, Leftow cannot mean by "simultaneous" "occurring at the same time," 
but something like "co-existent" or "coincident." The statement that God 
judges all events to be locally simultaneous is very obscure. He cannot mean 
that all events exist in God's timeless frame of reference, but are tenselessly 
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ordered by a "later than" relation such that no event occurs (tenselessly) later 
than any other, for that would be to affirm that there is only one time and all 
events occur at that moment of time. If we take literally Leftow's appeal to 
STR's doctrine of the relativity of simultaneity to reference frames, then we 
must say that just as a given set of causally unconnectable events will be 
calculated to sustain among themselves different relations of "earlier than," 
"simultaneous with," and "later than," in various reference frames, so in 
God's "frame of reference" no events are judged to be earlier or later than 
any other or even as occurring simultaneously. Rather in God's "frame" all 
events are judged to be timelessly coincident. In other words, in God's "frame 
of reference" the very topology of time is voided. It would be as though one 
took the series of real numbers and removed from it any ordering relation 
such as "greater than." The one-dimensional temporal continuum has been 
divested in God's "frame of reference" of those topological properties which 
make it isomorphous to a geometrical line, so that all that is left is an amor-
phous collection of points. Notice that in God's "frame" even causally con-
nected events, such as one's birth, development, decline, and death, are 
judged to sustain no temporal relations among themselves; they are all just 
timelessly coincident. It might be objected that if God judges one's birth to 
be coincident with one's death rather than earlier than it, then He is surely 
deceived. But if we take relativity seriously, as Leftow wishes to do, that is 
not the case. There is no privileged frame. Hence, no observer can impugn 
the temporal ordering of events determined by any other observer in another 
reference frame. Of course, in all physical frames the temporal order of 
causally connectable events is invariant. But in the special case of God, if 
Leftow's argument for (i) is correct, this invariance does not hold with respect 
to His "frame of reference." In fact, if anyone's frame is privileged, it will 
surely be God's, for the relativity of simultaneity arises only for events 
spatially distant from the observer; judgements of local simultaneity are nei-
ther conventional nor relative. But given Leftow's Zero Thesis, all events are 
in a sense local for God. Therefore, His judgement that all events are time-
lessly coincident should be absolute, and it is we who are deceived when we 
judge that they are temporally ordered (shades of McTaggart!). In fact, it is 
not clear to me that Leftow can avert also voiding space as well as time of 
any topological properties in God's "frame of reference." For in Relativity 
Theory, a difference in the value of the temporal coordinate of some event 
relative to two distinct reference frames requires a mathematically determi-
nate difference in the spatial coordinates of the event as well. Doubtless, 
Leftow would not say that the Lorentz transformation equations hold relative 
to God's "frame of reference" as for physical frames. Nonetheless, since an 
event's spatial coordinates are partially dependent upon its temporal coordi-
nates, events in God's "frame of reference," lacking any temporal coordi-
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nates, cannot be located in space either. To paraphrase Leftow: something is 
located in one dimension of a geometry if and only if it is located in all; so 
if it is correct to represent time as another dimension, it follows that whatever 
is not in time is not in space either: only temporal things are spatial. It 
therefore seems to follow that in God's "frame of reference" events not only 
occur timelessly but spacelessly as well. The topological structure of the 
four-dimensional space-time manifold has come completely unglued in the 
divine "frame of reference" so that all God is confronted with is a chaotic 
collection of points which are ordered neither spatially nor temporally. 
Leftow, however, clearly does not interpret the "local simultaneity" of all 
events in God's "frame of reference" in the above way. He states, "In eternity 
events are in effect frozen in an array of positions corresponding to their 
ordering in various B-series."33 In a footnote he explains that God does not 
see all events spread out in one B-series, since each reference frame generates 
its own unique B-series. There are thus a plurality of B-series and God must 
be aware of all of them. 34 Now this seems an eminently more reasonable 
account of the existence of temporal events in God's "frame of reference," 
but I do not see how this account concords with the theory of timeless eternity 
developed under (i). It needs to be understood that that account does not 
merely eliminate the A-determinations of events (monadic predicates like 
past, present, and future) relative to the divine "frame of reference," for STR 
itself takes no cognizance of such predicates in handling temporal relations 
among events in physical reference frames. Rather Leftow's account must 
also eliminate the B-determinations of events as well (dyadic predicates like 
earlier than, simultaneous with, and later than) relative to God's "frame of 
reference." For the relativity of simultaneity, which Leftow employs in order 
to stave off the Parmenidean conclusion that change is illusory and reality is 
a static whole, entails that events are classed relative to a reference frame as 
being either earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than any arbitrarily 
chosen point on the inertial trajectory of a hypothetical observer, and that 
observers in different frames will draw at any arbitrary point on their world-
lines different lines of simultaneity connecting events determined to be si-
multaneous with that point and dividing later from earlier events. Hence, 
relative to God's timeless "frame of reference," God must judge of any two 
events that one is neither earlier than the other, nor later, nor even strictly 
simultaneous; they are just timelessly coexistent relative to His frame. There-
fore, Leftow's theory must void even B-relations relative to the divine "frame 
of reference." Of course, an omniscient God must also know the lines of simul-
taneity which would be drawn by hypothetical observers relative to any physical 
reference frame; but in His "frame" events are chaotically co-existent. 
If the proponent of divine timelessness wants to preserve the B-relations 
among events, then it seems to me that his most plausible move will be to 
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identify God's "frame of reference" with the four-dimensional space-time 
manifold itself, which God transcends, and hold that that manifold exists 
tenselessly. In short: the B-theory of time is correct. Given the B-theory of 
time, the metaphorical and problematic notion of God's "frame of reference" 
becomes perspicuous and it becomes easy to see what is meant by divine 
timelessness and the presence of all things to God in eternity. 
(b.) The Relativity of Simultaneity 
Leftow, however, denies that his theory of divine eternity entails the B-theory. 
He claims that " ... a defender of God's eternity can assert that (in a strictly 
limited sense) one and the same event is present and actual in eternity though 
it is not yet or no longer present or actual in time."35 He explicates this by 
saying 
That is, it can be true at a time t that an event dated at t+ I has not yet occurred 
in time, and yet also correct at t to say that that very event exists in eternity. 
That all events occur at once in eternity ... does not entail that they all occur 
at once in time.36 
Unfortunately, it is not apparent to me that this explication is anything but 
a statement of the B-theory. A B-theorist like Griinbaum would be adamant 
that at t an event at t+l has not yet occurred in time (otherwise it would be 
earlier than t) and nonetheless this event exists tenselessly with as much 
actuality as the event at t; moreover, the B-theory does not assert the absurdity 
that all events occur at once in time, for then there would be only one moment 
of time! What Leftow needs to show is that his theory of the timeless exist-
ence of all things relative to God is compatible with the reality of tense, the 
objectivity of temporal becoming, the denial that all events exist tenselessly, 
and so forth. 
It is at this point that the Einsteinian interpretation of STR takes center 
stage in Leftow's defense. He argues, 
If simultaneity and presentness are relative to referem:e-frames, then if pre-
sent events are actual in some way in which future events are not, this sort 
of actuality is itself relative to reference frames. Thus there is a (strictly 
limited) sense in which the relativity of simultaneity entails a relativity of 
actuality, if one restricts full actuality to present eventsY 
This represents one way of integrating objective temporal becoming with 
STR, though it strikes me as enormously implausible. Sklar notes that a 
peculiarity of such a relativized view of becoming is that at my given space-
time point there will be events which are now such that they will be in my 
real past at some future time, but which will never have a present reality to 
me at all. 38 In fact, that is true of all events except for those lying on the 
single thread of my inertial trajectory which passes vertically on a Minkowski 
diagram through the vertex point of my past light cone. This follows from 
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the fact that all events having a space-like separation from me or lying inside 
or on my future-directed lightcone do not exist; at a later space-time point 
vast numbers of such events will be past for me and therefore real, though 
they were never present. Oddly enough, then, the present is not the moment 
of becoming for most events. Since, on the A-theory of time, things in the 
past, having become, are no longer existent, Sklar charges that the view under 
discussion collapses into a relativistic solipsism, in which reality is reduced 
to a single pointP9 On a theistic metaphysic, the charge of solipsism would 
not quite be justified, since as well as what exists here-now, God also time-
lessly exists. That still seems to be a pretty attenuated reality. But, of course, 
on Leftow's view, all events also exist timelessly in eternity with God. So 
reality is restored in its fullness; even though in my reference frame no events 
other than that which is here-now exist, nonetheless there is a reference frame 
in which all events exist. This escape from solipsism depends on the truth of 
tenet (i), which I have argued to be incoherent; but at least Leftow can claim 
that his view is not further burdened by solipsism. 
Leftow explains the result of relativizing actuality to reference frames: 
If we take eternity as one more frame of reference, then, we can thus say that 
a temporal event's being present and actual in eternity does not entail that it 
is present and actual at any particular time in any temporal reference frame 
(though it does follow that this event is, was or will be actual in all temporal 
reference frames).4o 
Again, I feel constrained to say that God's "frame of reference" is not literally 
a reference frame; there is no reference frame in which all events are present 
and actual, since there are in every frame space-time regions designated 
absolute future or absolute past as determined by the light-cone structure at 
any event. The only thing corresponding to God's "frame of reference" as 
described by Leftow, so far as I can see, is Einstein's relativistic ether, the 
space-time manifold itself. But since it is not a reference frame, the relativity 
of simultaneity relation does not obtain between it and local frames. Temporal 
becoming cannot be objective, for all events simply exist in the four-dimen-
sional manifold.41 
In another place, Leftow shows himself prepared to fall back, if necessary, 
to a sort of Stump-Kretzmann model which does not appeal to the Zero 
Thesis, but relies exclusively on the relativity of simultaneity in order to 
justify the claim that actuality is reference frame dependent and therefore 
events which are not actual with respect to various temporal reference frames 
may all be actual with respect to God's "frame."42 Suppose then that it is 
legitimate to speak of eternity'S constituting a reference frame. My misgiv-
ings about Leftow's theory strike much deeper than anything heretofore ex-
pressed, indeed, at the very philosophical foundations of the interpretation of 
Relativity Theory itself; namely, I, quite frankly, see no reason to think that 
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the relativity of simultaneity obtains at all. Leftow's appeal to STR to ground 
this relation, it seems to me, evinces a certain naivete concerning the philo-
sophical foundations of the received physical interpretation of Relativity 
Theory and an uncritical acceptance of that interpretation, which is then 
(mis)appJied to metaphysics. 
There are, after all, other physical interpretations of the Lorentz transfor-
mation equations that constitute the mathematical core of STR which are 
empirically equivalent to the received interpretation and which, if correct, 
would lead to completely different conclusions when applied metaphysically. 
As the Australian physicist Geoffery Builder points out, the only formulation 
of STR which is verifiable is "the theory that the spatial and temporal coor-
dinates of events, measured in anyone inertial reference system, are related 
to the spatial and temporal coordinates of the same events, as measured in 
any other inertial reference system, by the Lorentz transformation."43 But this 
verifiable statement is neutral, for example, with respect to the received 
Einsteinian interpretation and the neo-Lorentzian interpretation championed 
by Ives, Builder, Prokhovnik, and others.44 These two interpretations, while 
empirically indistinguishable, are radically different due to the different on-
tologies presupposed. 45 On the Einsteinian view, there exists no preferred 
spatio-temporal order; rather space and time are relative to inertial frames, 
and no frame is privileged. According to the neo-Lorentzian view, absolute 
space and time exist, not necessarily in the substantival, as opposed to rela-
tional, sense of "absolute," but rather in the sense that there exists a spatio-
temporal order which is privileged. There exists a universal, fundamental (or 
privileged) reference frame which is the analogue of the aether frame of 
nineteenth century classical physics but without the classical aether and 
which is usually identified with the frame of hypothetical fundamental ob-
servers stationary relative to the expansion of space itself as posited in current 
cosmological models. Light is propagated isotropic ally at velocity c relative 
to this fundamental frame alone and therefore will be propagated relative to 
observers in motion with respect to this frame at velocities exceeding or less 
than c. The consequence of motion relative to the fundamental frame will be 
certain anisotropy effects produced by dynamical causes operating on the 
moving systems, primarily length contraction in the direction of motion in 
order that the internal equilibrium of the system might be maintained. Time 
dilation effects follow immediately as a consequence of these anisotropy and 
contraction effects, as may be seen from the behavior of a light clock in 
motion relative to a frame at rest. It needs to be emphasized that on the 
Einsteinian interpretation length contraction and time dilation are no less real 
and objective physical effects, but there is under this interpretation no causal 
explanation for these effects, which follow simply as deductions from the two 
postulates of Einstein's formulation of the theory.46 Under the neo-Lorentzian 
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interpretation, the constancy of the observed velocity of light relative to all 
frames, observed length contraction of objects in motion relative to frames 
taken to be at rest, and time dilation of clocks, including all physical and 
biological systems, in motion relative to an observer taken to be at rest 
become physically intelligible, rather than mere postulates or deductions 
lacking physical explanation. 
Although it is often asserted that Einstein's version of the theory is simpler 
and therefore to be preferred, the claim that the Einsteinian interpretation is 
simpler is incorrect. Although Lorentz's own theory was more complicated 
than Einstein's, H. E. Ives was able to derive the Lorentz transformation 
equations from (i) the laws of conservation of energy and momentum and (ii) 
the laws of transmission of radiant energy. He showed that there is an apparent 
discrepancy in the equations for a particle governed by these laws which 
demands that the particle's mass vary with velocity. He then derived from 
these variations of dimensions the Lorentz transformations. "The space and 
time concepts of Newton and Maxwell are retained without alteration," he 
wrote, "It is the dimensions of the material instruments for measuring space 
and time that change, not space and time that are distorted."47 On Ives's 
achievement, Martin Ruderfer comments that he succeeded in elevating 
Lorentz's ad hoc theory to an equal status with STR and did so with the same 
number of basic assumptions as Einstein, so that his theory has the same 
"beauty." "The I ves and Einstein interpretations represent two different, but 
equally valid, views of the same set of observations."48 
We thus have two different interpretations of Relativity Theory which are 
radically different in their metaphysical foundations and yet which are, to 
date, experimentally indistinguishable and therefore insusceptible to scien-
tific adjudication. An examination of the philosophical foundations of Rela-
tivity Theory is therefore indispensable if we are to decide between these 
competing interpretations. Unfortunately, space does not permit me to delve 
into this fascinating issue here.49 But if a neo-Lorentzian interpretation is 
philosophically preferable (as I suspect that it is), then the rug is pulled from 
beneath the feet of theories of divine eternity appealing to STR in order to 
justify notions like ET-simultaneity or the presence of all things to God in 
timeless eternity. It therefore seems to me that it is of the utmost moment that 
proponents of divine timeless eternity address themselves more closely to the 
scrutiny and justification of the interpretation of Relativity Theory which they 
prefer and on which their theories are predicated. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, then, I think we can agree that there are reasons to doubt the 
legitimacy of the appeal to Relativity Theory to support the crucial theses (i) 
that temporal things exist in time and in timeless eternity and (ii) that the 
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timeless presence of all things to God is compatible with objective temporal 
becoming. The first of these rests upon category mistakes, presupposes a 
reductionist view of time, and seems incompatible with a tensed theory of 
time. The second involves the same conceptual mistakes, but also hinges upon 
a particular interpretation of STR which, though widespread, may by no 
means be the most plausible. It seems to me that a more promising route for 
defenders of divine timelessness to pursue would involve the explicit adop-
tion of a B-theory of time and the explication of a transcendent being's 
relations to the space-time manifold-but then, of course, they must face up 
to the case for the superiority of the A-theory over the B-theory. 
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